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 SUPER PAC ME: 
THE EFFECTS OF UNLIMITED SECRET MONEY IN THE 2012 E LECTIONS AND 
THE RENEWED NEED FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 
By Jason D. Angelo* 
"Thank you, God bless you all, and God Bless Citizens United!"1 The irony in Stephen 
Colbert's voice was apparent, but his point was not lost amongst the satire: following the 
Supreme Court's green-light in the controversial case Citizens United v. FEC, the 
unprecedented amount of money being expended in anticipation ofthe 2012 federal elections is 
cause for concern, and nothing less than the integrity of American democracy itself is at stake. 
Colbert' s late-night demonstration of the ease with which candidates can create and subsequently 
' distance' themselves from so-called super 'PACs' - political action committees that exist solely 
for promoting a specific candidate3 - made a mockery of a system built to safeguard the electoral 
process but now being manipulated by those who can ' pay to play' at the expense of those who 
cannot afford to have their voices heard. 4 
Why should the amount of money in politics matter to the average American? There are 
billions ofreasons.5 ' Big money' dominates the American political landscape and continually 
chips away at the integrity of our representative democracy; "wealthy contributors ... expect -
and too often receive - a return on their investment in the form of earmarks and legislative 
*J.D. Candidate, 2013, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A. in Political Science, B.A. in History, cum laude, 
University of Delaware, 2010. The author would like to thank Professor Marc C. Alexander for his guidance and 
expertise, Dr. James J. Magee of the University of Delaware for his inspiration and wisdom, and his family and 
friends for their unending support 
1 Late Night: Stephen Colbert Drops 'Super PAC' to Run For President, L.A. TIMES, Entertainment Blog, Jan. 13, 
20 12, http:/ /latimesblogs.latimes.com/showtracker/20 12/0 1/stephen-colbert -super-pac.html. 
2 129 S. Ct. 2893 (2010). 
3 The Campaign Jungle, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2011 , http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/13/opinion/sunday/the-
campaign-jungle.html. 
4 !d. 
5 Last year over $6 billion was spent on campaigns. Ellen L. Weintraub & Jason K. Levine, Campaign Finance and 
the 2008 Elections: How Small Change(s) Can Really Add Up, 24 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT.461 (2009). 
favors."6 When a super PAC 'legally' unconnected with a politician can solicit and receive a 
multi-million dollar donation used to propel that politician to an election victory previously 
thought to be impossible, it is clear that a virus has infected the political system and a strong 
disinfectant is necessary. 7 While the reasoning behind Citizens United -that money from 
independent groups cannot as a matter of law have a corrupting influence - might pass muster in 
a perfect world, who truly believes that "when a billionaire with a gambling interests gives [five 
million dollars] to a candidate-specific PAC, it does not have a corrupting influence .... "?8 
Although it may not seem like a pertinent or pressing issue to most of the American 
populace, the "invidious, systemic wrong" of the corrupting influence of money in politics has 
been likened to a ''sleeping sickness" that will eventually lead to the death of the body- in this 
case, the body politic.9 The founders of the United States provided future generations with a 
republic premised on representative democracy "dependent on the People alone." 10 
Unfortunately, after Citizens United, 'the People' means citizens with the wealth necessary to 
access those with political power, and this shift has led the nation down an unintended path of 
corruption. 11 
There is hope: people from all sides of the political spectrum - save some on Capitol Hill 
-share a common sense of urgency and feeling that something is wrong with our political 
6 Sen. Tom Udall, Policy Essay: Amend the Constitution to Restore Public Trust in the Political System: A 
Practitioner's Perspective on Campaign Finance Reform, 29 YALE L. & PoL'Y REv. 235, 246 (Fa112010). 
7 Nicholas Confessore and Eric Lipton, A Big Check, and Gingrich Gets a Big Lift, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2012, 
http:/ /www.nytimes.com/20 12/0 l/1 0/us/politics/ sheldon-adelson-a-billionaire-gives-gingrich-a-big-
lift.html?pagewanted=all. 
8 Fred Wertheimer, Super PACs Wreak Havoc, POLITICO, Jan. 18,2012, 
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0112/71603.html. , 
9 David V. Johnson, Reclaiming the Republic: An Interview with Lawrence Lessig, Bos. REVIEW, Nov. 11, 2011 . 
http://www.bostonreview.net/BR36.6/lawrence !essig republic lost campaign finance reform rootstrikers.php. 
10 Lawrence Lessig, More Money Can Beat Big-MoneY, N.Y. TIMES,Nov. 16,2011, - -
http://www.nytimes.com/20 11/11/17/opiniorJin-campaign-financing-more-money-can-beat-big-money .html. 
ll !d. 
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system. 12 Whether in the form of the Tea Party or the Occupy Wall Street movement, Americans 
have had enough of the status quo; the notion of corporate dominance of the political system 
continues to spur a populist backlash aimed at the Supreme Court, politicians, and those with the 
means to influence political decisions. 13 Americans are finally warming up to the notion that 
corporations "have no consciences, no beliefs, no feeling, no thoughts, no desires," and "do [not] 
belong to 'We the People' for whom the Constitution was written."14 
The 2010 federal elections were watershed moments in American history. It was in this 
election cycle that the true impact of the Supreme Court's about-face on its campaign finance 
jurisprudence could be seen. With the help of the Court and inability of Congress to respond with 
meaningful legislation, issue advocacy groups and independent expenditure groups were able to 
spend millions of unaccounted-for dollars on Congressional elections alone. 15 With the 
Presidency at stake, the 2012 elections is slated to be the most expensive election in American 
history, replete with untold amounts of anonymous spending from wealthy individuals and 
corporations alike. 16 
In a system where the candidate who raises and spends the most cash wins ninety-four 
percent of the time, the idea that secret, unaccountable donations can finance a candidate's 
12 Dan Froomkin, Candidate-Specific Super PACs offer end run for Maxed-Out donors: Study, THE HUFFINGTON 
POST, Oct. 4, 2011, http://www.huffmgtonpost.com/2011/10/04/candidate-specific-super-pacs-
donors_n_994260.html (reporting that seventy percent of the American people believe that most members of 
Congress are willing to sell their votes for either cash or campaign contributions). 
13 Justin Levitt, Confronting the Impact of Citizens United, 29 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 217,217, 2010, available at 
http:/ /yalelawandpolicy.org/sites/ default/files/Levitt_ 29. pdf. 
14 Linda P. Campbell, Commentary: Will Colbert Nation Make its point about super PACs in S.C. primary? FORT 
WORTii STAR-TELEGRAM, Jan. 19, 2012, http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2012/0l/19/136311/commentary-will-
colbert-nation.html. 
ts These groups spent a reported $750 million on campaign activities in the 2010 mid-term elections. Anne Farris 
Rosen, One House Seat in Kentucky embodies how outside groups dominate politics- with money, THE 
HUFFINGTON POST, Oct. 18, 2011 , http://www.huffmgtonpost.com/the-center-for-public-integrity/one-house-seat-in-
kentuck b 10 17313 .html. 
L
6 Rich Republicans are prepared to shell out $500 million to beat President Obama, and rich Democrats are 
prepardd to match that; in all, we are looking at a campaign involving over' $1 billion in secret, undisclosed money. 
Bob Edgar, Save the Small Donor, THE HUFFINGTONPOST, Nov. 15, 2010, http://www.huffmgtonpost.com/rev-bob-
edgar/save-the-small-donor _ b _78354 2 .html. 
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election is a troubling thought. 17 Such secret contributions are indeed a "formula for influence-
buying corruption," and if history is as good a teacher as it usually is, it should come as no 
surprise that such corruption "has happened before, and it will happen again" without decisive 
action by Congress. 18 A number of interests are at stake in this fight, the most important being 
the return of the political system to its rightful owners: the American people. 19 In tum, politicians 
need to be held accountable to their constituents and do the work they were elected to do, rather 
than spend their time fundraising for the next election cycle. Congress must be "more responsive 
to the voters, less busy chasing dollars, and less reliant on special interests"20 in order to be a true 
instrument of a democracy by and for the People. 
The American political system is in dire need of leaders who are prepared to meet the 
challenges presented by the percolation of wealth into the political system and ensure that 
governance in Washington, D.C. is no longer auctioned off to the bidder willing to contribute the 
most amount of money to a particular candidate or cause.21 In the aftermath of recent Supreme 
Court decisions, special interest groups and political insiders continue to exploit loopholes in the 
law to circumvent the rules and disclosure requirements surrounding soft-money donations. Even 
more distressing is the rise of individuals known as 'bundlers' who are able to corral and 
aggregate numerous donations into one lump-sum donation and provide a cash source for 
campaigns well beyond the normal contribution limits currently imposed on individuals by 
17 Dyian Ratigan, Get Money Out: Making Waves, THE HUFFINGTON POST, Oct. 3, 2011, 
http://www.huffmgtonpost.com/dylan-ratigan/get-money-out-making-wave b 992126.html. 
18 Fred Wertheimer, 2010 Elections: Secret Financing and the Campaign Ftna~ce Reform Battles to Come, THE 
HUFFINGTON POST, Nov. 3, 2010, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/fred-wertheimer/on-secret-financing-of-
20 b 778346.html. 
19 zz-R~turning the voting process to all Americans is an imperative, because elections are outs and belong to us, not 
Big .Oil or the health insurance companies or investment banks." Pearl Kom, Citizens United, an Assault on Our 
Democracy, Needs a Constitutional Amendment, THE BUFFINGTON POST, Oct. 22, 2010, 
http://www.huffmgtonpost.com/pearl-korn/citizens-united-an-assaul b 772482.html. 
w --Cheryl Chado, THE MODERN AMERICAN, Legislative Updates, Fall2010. 
21 Frank Rich, Still the Best Congress 1't!oney Can Buy, Op-ed Columnist, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.27, 2010, 
http://www .nytimes.com/20 10/11/28/ opinion/28rich.html?pagewanted=all. 
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federal law. The lack of any regulation of bundlers, coupled with the dearth of rules requiring 
mandatory disclosure of certain donors to political advocacy groups that choose a particular tax-
exempt status is an incredible threat to the openness and legitimacy of the American political 
system. 
Efforts in Congress to legislatively overturn recent Supreme Court decisions related to 
campaign finance laws have been futile/2 and although many politicians are making serious 
efforts to reform disclosure requirements, nothing has gained traction. It may take a cataclysmic 
event like the impending 2012 elections to spark any Congressional action on campaign finance 
reform, but by then, it may be too late to resurrect the system in the eyes of an increasingly 
cynical American electorate. This Note demonstrates the urgent need for more stringent 
regulation of how money and politics interact, specifically within the context of bundlers and so-
called 'super-PACs'. Part I will present an overview of campaign finance reform efforts in the 
United States and detail the current issues plaguing the system following the 2008 and 2010 
federal election cycles. Part II will briefly analyze the Supreme Court's campaign finance 
jurisprudence and detail Congressional efforts to limit the impact of the Court's recent rulings. 
Finally, Part III will offer an analysis of the various options available to combat the threats posed 
to the political system and offer suggestions on how Congress should move forward in 
addressing the anonymous donations and the proliferation of money in politics. 
Congress must act to insure the legitimacy of the political system. In an era of digital 
communications and ever-changing technology, disclosure is practicable and should be the norm 
with regard to any and all political donations. The flood of information that would result from 
closing the loopholes in the current disclosure rules would most certainly have a democratizing 
22 No legislation related to campaign finance reform in the wake of tlie 2010 Citizens United decision has, as of this 
time, been passed by both houses of Congress. 
5 
effect on the current system of obfuscation that shrouds many political donors in secrecy. 23 Now 
more than ever, Congress must adhere to Justice Brandeis' celebrated idea of"sunlight as the 
best disinfectant. "24 In order to rid the political system of the disease of corruption, it would be 
wise to take a lesson from history and require the complete disclosure of political contributions, 
close the loopholes that incentivize the creation of super-P ACS and encourage the practice of 
bundling, and revitalize the system of public financing of elections. Without further regulation of 
campaign finances, the current system will sink further into the abyss of quid-pro-quo 
corruption. 25 
I. Campaign Finance Reform in the United States 
a. Competing First Amendment Values 
At the heart of the constitutional debate surrounding political expenditures and 
contributions are competing values that can be traced back to the freedom of speech provision 
contained in the First Amendment. The purpose most often articulated for the existence of the 
amendment is to "preserve an unin..hibited marketplace of ideas in which the truth will ultimately 
prevai1."26 In the context of electoral politics and speech uttered during the course of a political 
23 Janine R. Wedel and Linda Keenan, Shadow Elite: The DISCLOSE Act- Who's Blindfolding the American 
Electorate?, THE BUFFINGTON POST, Sept. 23, 2010, http:/ /www.huffingtonpost.com/janine-r-wedel/shadow-elite-
disclose-act b 73 6127 .html. 
24 
"Publicityis]ustly commended as a remedy for social and industrial diseases Sunlight is said to be the best of 
disinfectants ... "Richard Briffault, Campaign Finance Disclosure 2.0, 9 ELECTION L. J. 273, 273 (Nov. 2010) 
(quoting Justice Louis Brandeis). 
25 
"A system with no restraints empowers 'capitalists to corrupt capitalism ... [s]o long as wealth can be used to 
leverage political power, wealth will be used to leverage political power to protect itself' against free market 
competition- the very system capitalists are pledged to support." Thomas B. Edsall, Putting Political Reform Right 
into the Pockets of the Nation 's Voters, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2011. 
26 FCC v. League ofWomen Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 377 (1984). 
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campaign, the principle advocating an unregulated marketplace of knowledge-· regardless of 
sources and motivations - "has its fullest and most urgent application. "27 
The Supreme Court continues to recognize only one legitimate government interest 
compelling enough to allow any sort of restrictions on free speech rights in the realm of 
elections: the avoidance of corruption or the appearance of corruption.28 All other justifications 
have been rejected. Specifically, the post-Buckley Court has stated that "the protection of 
political equality as a basis for limiting the role of money in election campaigns" is insufficient 
to overcome First Amendment protections?9 This rejection of an equalization theory is 
consistent with the Court's historical First Amendment jurisprudence.30 Absent a constitutional 
amendment or a significant jurisprudential retreat by the Court, leveling the playing field is not 
an appropriate means to achieving the end of fairness in American elections. 
The Supreme Court and other lower courts currently recognize that regulating 
independent expenditure groups such as P ACs does not fall into the anti-corruption rationale 
which would allow government regulation because "mere donations to non-profit groups cannot 
corrupt candidates and officeholder,"31 and it is "implausible that contributions to independent 
27 Eu v. S.F. Cnty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223 (1989). 
28 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
29Richard Briffault, The 527 Problem ... and the Buckley Problem, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 949, 954 (2005)0; see 
also Davis v. FEC, 128 S. Ct. 2759. 2773 (2008) (restating that equalization is not a "legitimate government 
objective"), Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. ·~§.~ (1990) ("The notion that the government 
has a legitimate interest in restricting the quantity of speech to equalize the relative influence of speakers on 
elections" is "antithetical to the First Amendment."); See also Austin, 494 U.S. at 684 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("This 
illiberal free-speech principle of 'one man, one minute' was proposed and soundly rejected in Buckley."). 
30 See Frederick Schauer & Richard H. Pildes, Electoral Exceptionalism and the First Amendment, 77 TEX. L. REv. 
1803, 1825 (1999) ("As a general matter, the American First Amendment tradition requires that the fmancial, 
political, or rhetorical imbalance between the proponents of competing arguments is insufficient to justify 
government intervention to correct that imbalance."). 
31 Emily's List v. FEC, 581 F.3d 1, 11 (D.C. Cir. 2010)(emphasis in original)(" And to the extent a non-profit then 
spends its donations on activities such as advertisements, get-out-the-vote efforts, and voter registration drives, those 
expenditures are not considered corrupting ,even though they may generate gratitude from and influence with 
officeholders and candidates. Rather, under Buckley, those expenditures are constitutionally protected."). 
Additionally, the Court found that non-profit groups do not have the same relationships with candidates as political 
parties; since they do not "select slate~ of candidates ... determine who will serve on legislative committees, elect 
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expenditure political committees are corrupting. "32 P ACs and other independent groups are 
deemed untouchable because they "offer an opportunity for ordinary citizens to band together to 
speak on the issue or issues most important to them. "33 
What appears to be a reinvigoration and strengthening of core First Amendment values 
by the Roberts Court is, however, a mere charade- more of the same smoke in mirrors seen so 
often in Supreme Court opinions. "Like prostitutes who masquerade as masseuses or head shop 
owners who insist their fancy water pipes are intended for use only with legal herbs," the groups 
spawned by the Supreme Court's desire to vehemently protect the marketplace of ideas are 
exemplifying the notion that "[i]nevitably .. . money will come with ... quid-pro-quo 
expectations and even more political corruption. "34 The idea that money equals speech is not 
new, and it should not be questioned. In the end, the issue is not whether money is speech, but 
"whether we should allow money to so dominate the political system that candidates become 
more focused on their dependency upon money than upon the People."35 
b. Historical Overview 
Congress often attempts to cleanse the political system of avarice and the corrupting 
influence of money. With the Pendleton Act of 1883, Congress attempted to reign in the quid pro 
quo nature of political kickbacks and favors; however, when money from civil servants was cut 
off, corporations quickly filled in the void left behind. 36 By the time President Theodore 
congressional leadership, or organize legislative caucuses," they should apparently therefore be free from regulation 
that would contravene the First Amendment. 
32 See N.C. Right to Life. v. Leake, 525 F.3d 274, 293 (4th Cir. 2008). 
33 Id. at 295. 
34 Jacob Sullum, Political contribution caps only fUnnel cash to SuperPacs, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Jan. 18,2012, 
http://www.suntimes.com/news/otherviews/10064846-452/political-contribution-caps-only-funnel-cash-to-
superpacs.html; Donors, Secrecy and that Loophole, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2012, 
http:/ /www.nytimes.com/20 12/01/06/ opinion/ donors-secrecy-and-that -loophole.html. 
35 See Johnson, supra note 9. 
36 The Pendleton Act outlawed the practice, employed since the Jackson Administration, of Federal civil servants 
being assessed a portion of their wages as a 'donation' or kickback to the political party that gave them their 
8 
Roosevelt took office, corporations held a disproportionate amount of influence within the 
political system. Congress attempted to remedy the situation via the 1905 Tillman Act, which 
banned political contributions from federally-chartered corporations, and the 1910 Publicity Act, 
which required post-election disclosure of contributions to both House and Senate campaigns. 37 
Additionally, the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act banned corporations and unions from spending their 
treasury money on electioneering. 38 
The Watergate Scandal provided the nation with another chance to revisit the issue of 
campaign financing, and the response to the disgraces of the Nixon Administration led to the 
passage of the Federal Elections Campaign Act of 1971 ("FECA").39 Financial contributions to 
candidates and parties became the target of federal regulations, as did expenditures by federal 
candidates and parties.4° FECA has been thoroughly litigated, and it was partially upheld in the 
seminal case Buckley v. Valeo. 41 In general, FECA imposes limits on money from certain sources 
and mandates disclosure of money raised and spent in federal elections.42 In its original form, 
FECA regulated the amounts of contributions individuals and political committees could make to 
politicians as well as the amount they could expend on behalf of candidates.43 It limits the 
amount of expenditures that political committees can make in connection with candidates, 
particular office; the assassination of President James Garfield by a dissatisfied former civil servant spurred the 
reforms. Philip M. Nichols, The Perverse Effect of Campaign Contribution Limits: Reducing the Allowable Amounts 
Increases the Likelihood of Corruption in the Federal Legislature, 48 AM. Bus. L. J. 1, 92 (Spring 2011). 
37 Unfortunately, the Publicity Act was rendered ineffective by the Supreme Court's decision in Newberry v. United 
States, 256 U.S. 232 (1921). Id. at 93. 
38 These laws and the laws of 22 states that also banned similar corporate donations were deemed unconstitutional in 
the Citizens United ruling in 2010. The Fair Elections Now Act: A Comprehensive Response to Citizens United: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Human Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary 
(testimony of Monica Y oun, Brennan Center for Justice, New York University School of Law) n.11, available at 
http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/pdfi'11-04-12%20Youn%20Testimony.pdf. 
39 2 U.S.C. §431 et seq. 
40 Ronald Dworkin, The Decision That Threatens Democracy, NEWYORKREVIEWOFBOOKS, May 13,2010. 
41 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
:~ See http://www. thecapitol.net/Publications/CRS _ Reports/RL33 888 .pdf:. 
See 2 U.S.C .. §431 et seq. 
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prohibits donations by, among others, foreign nationals, restricts the use of 'soft money', and 
prohibits certain uses of the money donated to federal candidates.44 
The next prominent piece of campaign finance legislation came in 2002, when the 
Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act (hereinafter "McCain-Feingold") was passed as an 
amendment to FECA. 45 At the heart of the Act is the banning of political contributions known as 
'soft money' - a phenomenon used to circumvent disclosure requirements and contribution limits 
that had become quite a nuisance in the period following the passage and various amendments to 
FECA.46 Soft money, as it is dealt with in McCain-Feingold, is a contribution to a political party 
or national campaign that is not designated for a specific candidate - and therefore was not 
subject to FECA regulations.47 Individuals, unions, and corporations were free to -and often did 
-make cash donations to support the 'general activities' of the national parties, which, in tum, 
went to advertisement campaigns aimed at increasing voter turnout and candidate recognition. 48 
As a result of McCain-Feingold, political parties, candidates, and office holders cannot solicit, 
receive, or direct anyone to donate soft money or anything of value that is not subject to FECA's 
regulations. 49 
While laudable, McCain-Feingold did little to "tum off the faucet" of money that had 
been flowing into federal elections; indeed, it merely "changed the address of soft money" from 
the national parties and their committees to newly-formed PACs, groups formed in coordination 
44 !d. 
45 
"Non-federal funds may not be used for the purpose' of influencing any election for federal office." Pub.L. 107-
155, 116 Stat. 81. 
46 Kevin J. Madden, Turning The Faucet Back On: The Future ofMcCain-Feingold's Soft-Money Ban After Davis v. 
Federal Election Commission 59 AM. U. L. REv. 2, 385, 388 (Dec. 2009). 
47 !d. 
48 !d. 
49 2 U.S.C. § 441i( d); McConnell, 540 U.S. at 99. 
10 
with entities commonly referred to by their tax-exempt status such as 50l(C) and 527 groups. 5° 
Unfortunately, McCain-Feingold has the exact opposite effect its sponsors intended: it drives 
money into the hands of unregulated third-party groups, many of whom are under no duty to 
disclose the sources of their funding. 51 McCain-Feingold did not go far enough, and indeed, it 
inadvertently adds to the appearance of corruption and corruption which it had originally sought 
to deter. 
b. 2008 and 2010: Learning from History's Lessons 
Many Americans, perhaps most exemplified by the recent Occupy Wall Street protestors, 
believe -however cynically- that "big money dominates our political system regardless of 
who's in power ... [and that] it has inexorably institutionalized a caste system" where only the 
voices of the adequately-funded are truly heard. 52 Indeed, the previous two elections cycles saw 
incredible influxes of money; 2008 heralded the largest amount of money ever raised and the 
greatest amount of individuals to donate to a candidate. 53 The spending by 50l(c) groups or 527s 
exacerbated the money chase and forced presidential candidates to opt out of the public financing 
system in order to keep up with flood of money being spent by these independent groups. 54 
501 (c)( 4) groups are now the vehicle of choice for those who wish to advocate for a 
certain cause without letting anyone know, and they are cause for particular concern. These 
groups include charities, unions, civic leagues, and social welfare organizations whose primary 
50 Indeed, by 2008, most soft money was being channeled through P ACs, most of which are commonly managed or 
receive their financial backing from 501 (c) and 527 groups. Press Release, CAMPAIGN FINANCE INSTITUTE, Soft 
Money Political Spending by 50J(c) Nonprofits Tripled in 2008 Election, Feb. 25, 2009, available at 
http://www.cfinst.org/press/pre1eases/09-02 
;
1
5/Soft_Money_Political_Spending_by_Nonprofits_Tripled_in_2008.aspx; Madden, supra note 46, at 414. 
Madden, supra note 46, at 414. 
52 Rich, supra note 21. 
53 Weintraub & Levine, supra note 5, at 461. 
54 Id. at 467. 
11 
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purpose must be promoting social welfare- not advancing a certain political message. 55 These 
groups can collect unlimited amounts of donations and do not have to publicly disclose the 
source of their donations. This shield of anonymity presents the distinct possibility that 
corporations and others give to groups backing controversial causes while unconnected to the 
cause and making the cause seem entirely grassroots in the eyes of the public. 56 
As long as their primary purpose is not political advocacy, 501(c)(4)s may make express 
advocacy appeals to the public. 57 While they cannot donate directly to individual candidates, 
they can promote them and attack their opponents provided they do not coordinate their efforts 
with any candidates or political party. 58 There are three main types of advocacy that these groups 
can undertake. Express advocacy appeals may be made to the public if it is merely a subsidiary 
purpose of the group. 59 Electioneering communications that name specific candidates are 
allowed within 60 days of a general election and 30 days of a primary election as long as they are 
not the "functional equivalent of express advocacy."60 Additionally, these groups can make even 
broader communications outside of the aforementioned time-frames and distribute other non-
express advocacy messages concerning certain candidates and their positions on issues. 61 
1. 501(c)(4)s and 527s: A Dangerous Combination 
To further exploit the disclosure and contribution limit loopholes, 501(c)(4) groups have 
embarked on a pattern of forming coordinate 527 groups, and following a recent decision in the 
55 See Press Release, supra note 50. These groups can "lobby without contribution limits as long as the topic of the 
lobbying directly relates to the organization's tax-exempt purpose" and "advocacy does not constitute the primary 
purpose" of the group. Lauren Daniel, Note, 527s in a Post-Swift Boat Era: The Current and Future Role of Issue 
Advocacy Groups in Presidential Elections, 5 Nw. J. L. & Soc. POL'Y 176 (Spring 2010). 
56 
"It's Christmas for consultants ... it's completely unlimited. And it's going to change everything." Nicholas 
Confessore, Lines Blur Between Candidates and PACs With Unlimited Cash, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2011. 
57 See Press Release, supra note 50. 
58 Id. 
59 !d. 
60 !d. 
61 Id. 
12 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, the former contribution limit of $5,000 per 
individual to such groups no longer applies.62 Created in harmony, these two groups together 
allow anonymous donations to be legitimately funneled into 501(c)(4) groups and in tum into 
527 groups- now deemed, in the post-2010 election world, as 'super-PACs'. 527 groups-
named for their classification under Internal Revenue Code - that call themselves issue advocacy 
groups are not subject to fundraising and contribution limits and thus have been the vehicle for 
wealthy individuals to donate unlimited sums of money in order to promote certain causes and 
candidates.63 Because they were not included within BCRA's soft-money ban, 527's have been 
allowed to "do the 'dirty work'" of candidates who seek to distance themselves from negative ad 
campaigns.64 Attempts by the FEC to regulate 527s, even on a case-by-case basis, have been 
struck down. 65 
The line between these PACs and individual candidates has become increasingly blurred; 
they often are founded by the former aides of political candidates, 66 are financed by the top 
donors to particular candidates, and may even be blessed by the candidates themselves. 67 They 
essentially function as 'shadow parties,' sharing office space, personnel, and strategies with 
national party committees and candidates, and they can take in unlimited amount of money-
62 The limit does not apply as long as the 527 group does not coordinate with a political candidate or party. 
Speechnow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. App 2011); Adam Liptak, Courts Take on Campaign Finance 
Decisions, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2010, 
http:/ /www.nytimes.com/20 10/03/27 /us/politics/27 campaign.html?pagewanted= 1. 
63 Daniel, supra note 55, at 150. §527 of the IRC covers groups that engaged in "influencing or attempting to 
influence the selection, nomination, election, or appointment of any individual to any federal, state, or local public 
office. I.R.C. § 527 (e)(2). 
64 Daniel, supra note 55, at 157. 
65 See Emily's List, 581 F.3d 1. 
66 
"What we've essentially said is, if you've maxed out to the Senate Committee, the Congressional Committee, or 
the R.N.C. and you'd like to do more, under the Citizens United decision, you can give money to American 
Crossroads [a coordinate 527 group]." Jeffrey Toobin, Money Talks, THE NEW YORKER, Apr. 11, 2011, 
http://www.newyorker.com/talk/comment/2011/04/ll/110411taco talk toobin. 
67 - -See Press Release, supra note 50. 
13 
including money from corporate treasuries.68 The 'revolving door' of staff between campaigns 
and these candidate-centered P ACs make their close relationship clear and borders on the limits 
of legality; the million dollar donations made to the P ACs are now just as dangerous and 
corruption-inducing as if they were made to a candidate themself. 69 They are, in essence, being 
utilized as an end-run around the contribution limits imposed by FECA. 70 
After receiving the green light by the courts, these groups exploded onto the scene in the 
2010 Congressional mid-term elections.71 Independent electioneering expenditures reached 
$280.2 million in 2010- double the 2008 figures and five times the 2006 figures. 72 Thirty-five 
percent of that spending was done furtively by uncapped and unregulated entities.73 Ahead of the 
2012 election, the picture is even more disturbing, and the 'double-dipping' practice of donating 
to both candidates and technically unrelated PACs and 501(c)(4)s is reaching a new height. 74 The 
new norm in campaign donations is to donate the maximum amount allowed by law to a 
particular campaign and almost immediately give a substantially larger amount to a related 
PAC. 75 
68 Of the 27 501(c)(4) groups that spent over $1 million in 2010, 12 had coordinate PACs that had commonly-
managed components. Youn, supra note 38, at 8. 
69 See Froomkin, supra note 12. 
70 They are essentially arms of campaigns sprouted in order to gamer unlimited contributions from big-time donors 
and evade the traditional contribution limits. Id. 
71 Nearly $300 million was poured by these groups into ad campaigns. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce alone 
amassed an $86 million contribution from the health insurance industry to lobby against ObamaCare, and it spent 
over $32 million on federal electioneering in the 2010 election cycle. Youn, supra note 38, at 5. 
72 !d. 
73 For example, over $85 million was spent on U.S. Senate races by these groups, $65.4 million of which was spent 
on the top ten races and thirty percent of which was funded by anonymous donors. Id. 
74 Within the Obama-supporting PAC, Priorities USA, 9 of 24 donors were responsible for eighty-two percent of the 
money raised thus far. Froomkin, supra note 12. 
75 In the case ofthe Romney-supporting PAC Restore Our Future, 55 of75 people who had given to the PAC in the 
second quarter of 20 11 had already given to the Romney campaign itself; most had donated the maximum of $2500 
and then given as much as $1 million to the PAC. 'Double-dippers' represent nearly seventy-five percent of the 
PAC's individual donors. Froomkin, supra note 12. 
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2. Advent of the 'Bundler' Phenomenon 
The 2000s also saw the meteoric rise of the use of individuals known as bundlers to raise 
large aggregate amounts of fast-cash for campaigns. First employed by the Bush campaign in 
2000- not coincidentally, also the first presidential campaign to opt-out of the public financing 
system since its inception in 197676 -bundling is now an essential element of any presidential 
campaign. The Bush campaign gave these individuals special titles, such as pioneers or rangers, 
and also gave them privileged access to the soon-to-be President depending on how many checks 
they could deliver to the campaign coffers. 77 
Bundlers are intermediaries who receive contributions, often the maximum legal amount 
a person can donate, and 'bundle' them together into one lump-sum donation to a political 
campaign; in tum, bundlers are credited with and are often rewarded for soliciting the 
contributions with access to and influence over a candidate. 78 They are often independently 
wealthy and well-connected to other affluent individuals. Often, their focus is to get the absolute 
maximum combined contribution allowable by law from a large group of friends and associates, 
which is about $38,500 for donations to both the party committee and the candidate. 
The 2012 election cycle, already in full-swing, has seen the rise of the super-bundler-
someone tasked with raising an exorbitant amount of money for a candidate by aggregating 
76 Weintraub & Levine, supra note 5, at 465. 
77 Paul Blumenthal, Obama Bundlers Raise $55.5 Million For President's Re-Election, Oct. 15, 2011., 
http://www.huflmgtonpost.com/2011/10/15/barack-obama-bundlers-55-million-dollars-re-election_n_1011877.html. 
78 Scott M. Noveck, Campaign Finance Disclosures and the Legislative Process, 47 HARVARD J. ON LEGIS. 75, 101, 
2010 (detailing the bundling phenomenon and the loophole that currently exists); Many of President Obama's 
bundlers from the 2008 election received perquisites such as jobs in his Administration following his election. 
Michael Beckel, Two Dozen Bankrollers-Turned-Ambassadors Bundled at Least $10 Million for Barack Obama, 
OpenSecrets Blog, Nov. 18, 2009, http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2009/llltwo-dozen-
bankrollerstumedamb.html. (reporting that at least 24 high-profile bundlers were given ambassadorships in the 
Obama Administration, as was done in the Clinton and Bush Administrations). 
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individual contributions. 79 But there is something different about the 2012 elections: the 
unspoken rules have changed. No longer are candidates voluntarily releasing the names of their 
bundlers; in fact, President Obama is the only candidate thus far to release a list. 80 While the 
rules regarding disclosure of bundlers are sparse, all candidates since former President Bush in 
2000 have voluntarily released a list of their bundlers to the public. 81 As of now, it appears the 
only way to avoid even more secrecy involving political fundraising is for Congress to 
promulgate a new set of rules aimed at increasing the transparency of the relatively unregulated 
practice of bundling. 
c. Reasons for Reform 
Nothing less than the integrity of the American electoral process- a vital ingredient for a 
healthy democracy - is at stake in the midst of the aforementioned developments in the 
campaign finance arena. 82 Reducing money's - specifically secret money's - chokehold on the 
electoral system and thus combating corruption and the appearance of corruption are the main 
reasons that reform is needed.83 With 2012 expected to be another "expensive slugfest," and with 
special interests pledging to destroy the records set in the 201 0 elections, reform is needed now 
more than ever. 84 By removing the layers of obfuscation created by loopholes and court 
79 The early and aggressive bundling campaigns prove that the 2012 election is going to dwarf the 2010 cycle in 
terms of money spent. Already, 352 bundlers have collected at least $55.5 million for the President's reelection from 
the period of April to September 2011, and five new bundlers have raised over $500,000. Blumenthal, supra note 
77. 
80 ld. 
8t Id. 
82 Y oun, supra note 3 8, at 5. 
83 Campaign finance reform is about "systemic efforts to ensure republican government that is responsive to the 
people." Marc C. Alexander, Citizens United and Forgotten Equality (forthcoming) 
84 Youn, supra note 38, at 5 (referencing Eliza Newlin Carney, Democrats Join the Battle, NAT'LJOURNAL, Feb. 27, 
20 11, http:/ /www.nationaljoumal.com/columns/rules-of-the-game/ democrats-join-the-battle-20 110227; Tom 
Hamburger & Matea Gold, Some Democrats Favor a Shift to More Outside Campaign Spending, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 
4. 2010, http://www.articles.latimes.com/2010/nov/04/nation/la-na-money-politics-20101104; Andy Kroll, Will 
Secret Spending Divide Democrats?, MOTHER JONES, Nov. 15, 2010, 
http://motherjones.corrJpolitics/2010/11/obama-outside-spendgin-2012-election; Peter H. Stone, Democrats 
Desperately Seek Their Own Rove, CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY, Mar. 14,2011, 
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decisions, Congress can act not only to promote the judicially-sanctioned goal of fighting 
corruption, but also to promote egalitarianism and political accountability in an era severely 
lacking both. 
Allowing wealthy interests greater access to public officials and, thereby, greater 
influence over legislative decisions and policy outcomes is a central concern underlying any 
attempt at campaign finance reform and regulation. 85 The close relationship between money and 
politics, coupled with the realities of economic inequalities within the United States, translates 
into a system that is antithetical to the democratic underpinnings of the American constitutional 
regime. 86 Undoubtedly, wealthy citizens have an incentive to support policies that entrench their 
personal interests, even at the expense of the less fortunate. 87 As a result, unregulated 'speech' in 
the form of money contravenes one of the primary purposes of the First Amendment: to ensure 
that all citizens, regardless of their economic status, are equal partners within the political 
process and have equal access to both politicians and the marketplace of ideas. 88 Thus, one 
motivation for reform revolves around the idea that Americans are committed to a view of the 
legislative process that is more akin to a one person, one vote election than a process that is able 
to be sold to those willing to pay the most. 
Both lawmaker and corporate political accountability is a central concern underlying the 
need for reform. Currently, incumbents and those candidates supported by PACs and other 
independent expenditure groups are at an incredible advantage in terms of money and exposure 
to their constituents; indeed, the massive amounts of fundraising stifle any competitiveness in the 
http://www.publicintegrity.org/articles/entry/3019). See also Rosen, supra note IS( chronicling one U.S. House race 
and how the influx of unregulated independent expenditures has effected how political campaigns are conducted). 
85 Noveck, supra note 78, at 5. 
86 Id. 
87 !d. 
88 See generally Alexander, supra note 83; see also Dworkin, supra note 40. 
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political arena on the federal level.. Lawmakers often benefit from campaign contributions from 
the very interests and industries that they are charged with regulating, creating at the very least 
the appearance of impropriety and giving credence to the cynicism and contempt with which 
many Americans view Congress. 89 
Perhaps the most disturbing consequence of the influx of money in recent elections has 
been the amount of time that lawmakers have been forced to devote to fundraising. The time and 
energy of politicians is no longer devoted to constituent issues or to reading and making 
decisions on the merits of legislation; rather, the majority of their free time is now spent raising 
more money to keep up with the money flowing from independent expenditure groups. 90 With 
less time to fulfill their legislative obligations or meet with constituents, it follows that only those 
able to contribute significant sums to a candidate will gamer their attention, thus depriving 
average citizens from being heard and from fostering appropriate debates on important issues.91 
It is easy to see a point in the future where lawmakers, no matter how much time they spend 
fundraising, will no longer be able to keep up with the efforts of independent groups, and this 
cycle has already- and will continue to - deterred many qualified people from seeking political 
office.92 
If there is any doubt to whether politician's time and efforts are being consumed by 
money, one need only ask the politicians themselves. Many politicians are tired of making the 
89 Youn, supra note 38, at 11. It also speaks volumes that currently, Congress has a laughable nine percent approval 
rating among American adults according to a recent New York Times/CBS News poll. Felicia Somnez, 
Congressional Approval Drops to Single Digits, WASH. POST, Oct. 26, 2011 , 
http://www. washingtonpost.comlblogs/2chambers/post/ congressional-approval-drops-to-single-
digits/2011110/26/giQAufAAJM_blog.html. 
90 Professor Alexander argues that politicians are currently locked in an ever-escalating cycle of fundraising that 
grows with each election, and that 'time-protection' -saving politicians from this cycle - should be a compelling 
interest sufficient to justify upholding tougher campaign fmance regulations. Alexander, supra note 83, at 17. 
91 Levitt, supra note 13, at 23 3. 
92 !d.; Udall, supra note 6, at 246 ("Congress is stuck in the mud of strident partisanship, excessive ideology, never-
ending campaigns, and - at th.e heart of it all - a corrosive system of private campaign fun.di11.g and the constant 
fundraising it demands."). 
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efforts to lure funds from wealthy donors and interests, many of whom are not located in the 
politician's home state.93 Many are also disturbed by the corrosive effects of the cycle of 
fundraising on the legislative process.94 When lawmakers are reporting spending up to twenty 
hours per day attempting to coax donations from wealthy individuals and that they devote fifty 
percent of their free time to fundraising, it is clear that action must be taken to break this cycle. 95 
The ability of cor-Porations to make potentially anonymous and unlimited contributions to 
groups favoring certain causes is also a reason for concern. Unlike candidates, corporations are 
not politically accountable. Despite being equated on the same level as an individual in the eyes 
of the law, they enjoy numerous advantages that people generally are not fortunate enough to 
possess, including limited liability, perpetual life, and favorable tax treatment of assets. 96 Indeed, 
the aim of corporation is to increase profits regardless of conflicting political priorities or social 
concerns.97 Moreover, the financial clout of corporations cannot be underestimated; it would be 
easy for funds from a corporate treasury to dominate an election, as their immense profits dwarf 
any aggregate amounts spent in an election cycle. 98 Large corporations often have specific 
agendas, many of which contravene conventional public wisdom and opinion.99 Left unchecked, 
93 
"Too often, Members' first thought is not what is right or what they believe, but how it will affect fundraising. 
Who, after all, can seriously contend that a $100,000 donation does not alter the way one thinks about-- and quite 
possibly votes on- an issue?" See Wertheimer, supra note 18. See also Udall, supra note 6, at 237 ("With each 
election the cost of campaigns ratchets up, creating an endless campaign cycle in which elected officials spend far 
too much time engaged in fundraising rather than doing the work the American people elect them to do . As the 
Pressure to raise money increases, incumbents dedicate more and more of their time in office to fundraising and the 
incentive to accept large contributions intensifies."). 
94 
"[L ]arger donations effectively purchase greater benefits for donors ... Large soft money contributions in fact 
distort the legislative process. They affect what gets done and how it gets done. They affect who Senators and House 
member are, whom they spend their time with, what input they get, and make no mistake about it, this money affects 
outcomes as well." See Wertheimer, supra note 18 (quoting former Republican Sen. Warren Rudman). 
95 Youn, supra note 38, at 14. 
96 Molly J. Walker Wilson, Too Much of a Good Thing: Campaign Speech After Citizens United, 31 CARDOZO L. 
REv. 2365,2382 (June 2010). 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 2389. 
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the war chest of a corporate treasury can have an incredible impact on an election and the 
messages that are put out to the public in support of particular candidates and policies. 
The main concern is that with such vast resources, corporate interests will now be able to 
effectively drown out those who oppose their policy stances within the free marketplace of ideas 
that is so crucial to a vibrant democracy. Corporate speech, if left unchecked, does have the 
potential to create a distortion and lead some citizens to make a policy judgment that they might 
not otherwise have made. 100 While allowing corporations to spend money advocating certain 
issues will undoubtedly create more 'speech' within the marketplace of ideas, this is not 
necessarily a good thing if other viewpoints are drowned out by the amount of speech being 
placed within the market. 101 Additionally, voters may equate the amount and quality of 
advertising that they see with the breadth of support behind a certain candidate or idea, and a 
particular viewpoint may gain more force in the eyes of some voters simply because they are 
constantly being inundated with ads in its support. 102 Most significantly, advertisements may 
appear to speak on behalf of a campaign or candidate and in support of the general welfare when 
they are actually advancing a specific corporate interest. This effectively allows corporations to 
hide behind the shadow of the 501(c)(4) and 527 groups that put out such advertisements. 103 
The beginnings of the 2012 election cycle illustrate that Super P ACs and other powerful 
individuals can now exert an incredible amount of influence and power as a direct result of 
100 Levitt, supra note 13, at 225. 
101 
"Monopolies and near-monopolies are just as destructive to the marketplace of ideas as they are to any other 
market." Dworkin, supra note 40. CfLevitt, supra note 13, at 225 (asking whether it is really a bad thing if a voter 
makes a decision based on an accurate idea after assessing it on the merits, regardless of whether the message is 
funded in whole or in part by corporate interests). 
102 Levitt, supra note 13, at 215-16. 
103 
"Individuals speak for themselves, together or in association with other individuals, while corporations speak for 
their cmmnercial interests and spend other people's money, not their own." Dworkin, supra note 40 (noting that 
corporations are legally required to spend corporate funds only to promote their own financial interests). 
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recent Supreme Court decisions and Congressional inaction. 104 Even one candidate, former 
Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich, openly admits that there is no other choice, given the 
current state of the law, than for a campaign to have at least one Super PAC that "spend[s] an 
absurd amount of money" mostly on negative ads. 105 Super P ACs, such as American Crossroads 
and Americans for Prosperity, are hoping to spend upwards of two-hundred million dollars 
during the 2012 election cycle on advertisements, thus freeing up the national party committees 
from such obligations and allowing them to focus on voter turnout issues. 106 
Between bundlers, P ACs, and super P ACs, the public has little idea about from where the 
money being pumped into the current election cycle is coming. Mitt Romney refuses to release 
his list of bundlers, and investigations reveal that they include top officers of private equity and 
venture capital firms. 107 Meanwhile, Newt Gingrich's entire campaign received a last-minute 
injection of life support in the form of a multi-million dollar check from a personal friend to the 
Gingrich-supporting super-PAC- an amount one-thousand times the amount one could legally 
give directly to the Gingrich campaign during one year. 108 
II. The Court and Congress: At Odds from the Beginning 
a. From Buckley to Citizens United and Speechnow.org 
The seminal case in campaign finance reform jurisprudence is Buckley v. Valeo, decided 
in 197 6 after a challenge to FECA. The Court upheld limits on political contributions but found 
104 
"The Super P ACs are outspending the candidate committees two to one ... just like in the world of business and 
advertising, politics goes the same way. Those that spend the most have the biggest impact." Jessica Hopper, 
Unlimited contributions give 'Super PACs' power to change presidential race, Rock Center, Jan. 16, 2012, 
http://rockcenter.msnbc.msn.com/_news/20 12/01/16/10167332-unlimited-contributions-give-super-pacs-power-to-
change-presidential-race. 
105 !d. 
106 Nicholas Confessore, Outside Groups Eclipsing G.O.P. as Hub of Campaigns, N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 2011. 
107 Michael Isikoff, Guess Who's Raising Money For Romney: Bigiwgs From Private Equity Firms, MSNBC Jan. 
12. 2012, http://frrstread.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2012/0l/12/10142991-guess-whos-raising-money-for-romney-
bigwigs-from-private-equity-frrms. 
108 Nicholas Confessore, A Big Check, and Gingrich Gets a Big Lift, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2012. Gingrich noted that 
he had "no objection to [the donor] counterbalancing Romney's millionaires." 
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that limits on expenditures were an unjustified burden on First Amendtnent free speech rights of 
candidates. 109 Buckley equated money with speech, and political expenditures by candidates, 
parties, committees, or other groups or individuals are given the greatest constitutional 
protection. 11° Contributions -payments made to a candidate, party, committee, or other political 
actor to fund communication to voters -- are treated as a lower form of speech, and while still 
subject to strict scrutiny, limits on contributions may be justified by an anti-corruption 
purpose. 11 1 
The only compelling interests recognized by the Court as justification for contribution 
limits are the prevention or the appearance of corruption. Concerned with quid pro quo issued 
and the overall integrity of the system in the eyes of the American populace, the Court struck a 
balance that allowed those with wealth to use it to support candidates and political parties as long 
as those expenditures are not coordinated with an actual campaign.112 Egalitarian concerns used 
to justify limits on expenditures and contributions were- and continue to be- summarily 
rejected as compelling interests by the Court. 113 
In 2010, the Supreme Court stepped in to resolve the issue of whether independent 
expenditures, specifically expenditures from corporate treasuries, could be limited. Citizens 
United is recognized by many as a major doctrinal shift in jurisprudence with enormous practical 
consequences that will reshape the way elections are conducted. No other decision of the Court 
in recent history has "generated such open hostilities among the three branches of 
109 See Buckley, 424 U.S. 1; Levitt, supra note 13, at 218 . 
110 Limits on expenditures are subject to strict scrutiny, and combating corruption or the appearance of corruption is 
not considered a compelling government interest necessary to sustain expenditure limits. Richard Briffault, 
Symposium: An Intersection of Laws: Citizens United v. FEC: On Dejudicializing American Campaign Finance 
Law, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 887, 896, Summer 2011. 
Ill Jd. 
112 Id. at 897-900. 
113 The Court found that such interests were "wholly foreign to the First Amendment," and could not be used to 
limits a candidate's use of his own wealth, the total amount a campaign spends, or expenditures by in.dependent 
people or groups promoting or opposing specific candidates. Id. at 898. 
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government." 114 Overruling a prior line of jurisprudence, as well as a portion of McCain-
Feingold, the Court held that the government cannot restrict independent corporate-funded 
electoral advocacy. 115 The court also refused to consider empirical evidence of the effects of 
corporate spending on the politicians who benefit from corporate donations. 116 In a slightly 
cynical yet prescient observation, Justice Stevens, in dissent, noted that "the only relevant thing 
that has changed [since the Court's prior campaign finance decisions] . .. is the composition of 
this Court." 117 
Putting First Amendment concerns once again at the forefront of its analysis, the Court 
unapologetically privileged speech despite the recognized negative effects of corporate money 
on the political system. 118 In reaffirming the premise that money is speech when spent on 
political advocacy, the Court also reiterated that the only viable compelling government interests 
for limiting campaign contributions are to reduce actual corruption or the appearance thereof. 119 
In the typical fashion of the Roberts Court, Justice Kennedy went to great lengths to base the 
ruling on need for an informed electorate and the idea that freedom of political speech for all is 
an essential prerequisite of an effective democracy. The Court extolled the virtues of uninhibited 
speech for all, and it rationalized its decision with the premise that a large amount of speech, 
regardless of its source, ensures that voters have access to as wide and diverse a range of 
information and political opinions as possible.120 Assuming, perhaps naively, that all voters are 
and seek to be fully informed and deliberate difference viewpoints based on their merits and 
114 Dworkin, supra note 40. 
115 Corporations are now able to advocate expressly for or against any candidate. Levitt, supra note 13, at 220. 
116 Briffault, supra note 110, at 902-03. 
117 Youn, supra note 38, at 4 (quoting Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 942 (Stevens, J. dissenting)). 
118 Wilson, supra note 96, at 2367. 
119 Id. 
120 Dworkin, supra note 40; Richard Briffault, Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC: The Beginning of the 
End of the Buckley Era?, 85 MINN. L. REv. 1729, 1764 (2001) (arguing that elections are about giving the electorate 
a variety of choices, but if one politician is well-funded, the public is likely to hear more from that candidate then his 
opponents). 
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sources, the Court gave complete credence to the notion that forbidding limits of corporate 
expenditures will add to the 'free' marketplace of ideas and give power to the informed and 
settled opinions of the largest number of people. 121 
Following the Court's decision in Citizens United, two decisions by the D.C Circuit 
Court of Appeals further protected independent expenditure committees from reach of 
government regulation and illustrate what some call a movement towards a completely 
deregulated campaign finance system. 122 The Court's decision in Emily's List v. FEC stands for 
the premise that, unless they act in direct coordination with a candidate or a party, a 527 may 
receive and spend unlimited amounts of money, and thus, 527s have been given the go-ahead to 
expressly advocate for certain candidates. 123 In Speechnow.org v. FEC, the Court cited Citizens 
United for the principle that by definition, independent expenditure groups do not corrupt despite 
influence over or access to politicians to toss out a variety of FEC regulations applied to 
independent expenditure groups; "ingratiation and access [by and to politicians]," according to 
the Court, "are not corruption."124 While invalidating any limits on contributions to such 
co!T'..mittees in lig...l].t of Citizens United, the D.C. Court of Appeals upheld the various reporting 
and disclosure requirements implemented by the FEC, stating that the "public has an interest in 
knowing who is speaking about a candidate and who is funding that speech" because such 
disclosure "deters and helps expose violations of other campaign finance restrictions .... "125 
b. Congressional Response 
121 d ~ .; Noveck, supra note 78, at 102. 
122 David D. Kirkpatrick, Court Rejects Rules on Spending by Nonprofits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18,2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/19/us/politics/19donate.html. 
123 Emily's List, 581 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Daniel, supra note 55, at 151. 
124 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 910. 
125 Speechnow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d at 686, 697 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
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While they expanded the amount of unaccounted-for money floating around in federal 
elections, Citizens United and Speechnow.org did not sound a death knell to Congress's ability or 
need to pass further campaign finance reform bills. Various Congressmen have proposed closing 
the loopholes allowing 501(c)(4) groups to avoid disclosure or donate anonymous funds to their 
corresponding 527 PACs; however, no proposal has been passed in both chambers of Congress. 
Two of the most important and necessary pieces of legislation introduced before Congress are 
detailed below. 
i. The Fair Elections Now Act (FENA) 126 
Perhaps the most sweeping attempt at campaign finance reform since the post-Watergate 
era, FENA was reintroduced in 2011 by Senator Richard Durbin asS. 750 and Representative 
John Larson as H.R. 1404 and would amend FECA by creating a Fair Elections Fund and Fair 
Elections Oversight Board.127 By creating- for the first time- a public financing system for U.S. 
Senator and House elections, the bill seeks to free candidates from constant fundraising and 
allow them to better focus on the needs of their constituents and the demands of their job. 128 By 
providing such a system, FENA would make small donors the key players in financing elections 
rather than those able to make massive contributions. 129 
Under the proposed set of rules, matching funds would be available to qualified 
congressional candidates who agree not take large donations from P ACs or other individuals; the 
system is completely voluntary. Candidates for the House must first solicit 1500 donors from 
their home state and raise at least $50,000; this would discourage those with limited support and 
126 Americans for Campaign Reform, http://www/acrrefonn.org/legislationlfair-elections-now-act/. 
127 Cheryl Chado, THE MODERN AMERICAN, Legislative Updates, Fall2010. 
128 Id.; Sam Waterston, Historic Movement on Fair Elections, THEHUFFINGTON POST, Sept. 23, 2010. 
http://www.huffmgtonpost.com/sam-waterstonlhistoric-movement-on-fair b 737084.html. 
129 --Wertheimer, supra note 18. 
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money from running and taking advantage of the public financing system. 130 House candidates 
would receive up to $900,000 in FENA funds- forty percent for the primary election and sixty 
percent for the general election. 131 They would also receive a media voucher of$100,000, with 
an added option of trading in that voucher to their national party committee for cash. 132 Taking 
into account their smaller numbers, Senate candidates must receive donations from 2,000 
constituents plus 500 for each congressional district within their state. 133 Candidates would 
receive up to $1.25 million plus $250,000 per congressional district within their state and 
$100,000 in tradable media vouchers. 134 
Candidates opting into the system would be eligible to receive funding for both the 
primary and general elections. They would also be rewarded for continuing to solicit small-time 
donations by receiving $4 for every $100 they raise over the initial threshold and would get an 
additional twenty percent reduction in the lowest broadcast rates on all television and radio 
advertising. 135 The cost of the system, estimated at between $700-850 million per year 
depending on how many candidates participate, would be covered by adding a fee to large 
government contractors- those companies receiving contracts of over $50,000- for Senate 
elections and by using ten percent of the revenues raised by an auction of an additional 
broadcasting spectrum for House races. 136 
130 See generally http://www.fairelectionsnow.org/about-bill. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. 
133 !d. 
134 !d. 
135 Id. 
136 http:/ /www.fairelectionsnow.org/about-bill. 
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ii. Democracy is Strengthened by Casting Light on Spending in Elections 
(DISCLOSE) Act 
The DISCLOSE Act takes a different approach at combating corruption in the political 
arena and rebuking Citizens United by requiring disclosure and compelling companies to inform 
shareholders about political spending, as well as requiring corporate CEO's to appear in any 
political ads funded by their companies. 137 Passed in the House in 2010, the legislation stalled in 
the Senate due to repeated Republican filibusters. 138 If passed by the Senate, the bill would 
function as another amendment to FECA. Full disclosure of any donors of political ads run by 
corporations, unions, 527 groups, and trade associations would be mandatory. 139 The Act would 
encourage small donors to continue giving while requiring groups to disclose the names of all 
donors who have given $1,000 or more to the group for independent expenditures or 
electioneering conununication or those who make donations of more than $10,000 for 
unrestricted purposes. 140 
Corporations would also be held accountable for political expenditures and released for 
the American public to digest. Heads of corporations would have to appear in ads they sponsor, 
expressing approval of the ad.141 The CEO or highest ranking official must say they approve the 
message on camera within the ad itself; if the ad is sponsored by a PAC, the top funder of the ad 
137 Wilson, supra note 96, at 2391. 
138Michael Beckel, Senate Republicans Again Block DISCLOSE Act, Designed to Reveal Special Interest Spending, 
Open Secrets Blog, http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2010/09/senate-republicans-again-block.html; Paul Loeb, An 
Antidote to Unaccountable Corporate Lies: How to Pass the DISCLOSE Act, THEHUFFINGTONPOST, Aug. 2, 2010, 
http:/ /www.huffmgtonpost.com/paul-loeb/ an-antidote-to-corporate_ b ~667 57 4 .html ( reporting that every 
Republican Senator, representing only eleven percent of the Country's population, backed a filibuster and 
effectively killed the bill). 
139 Evail Mackinder, Disclose, Disclaim, Report: Democrats Reveal New Campaign Finance Legislation, Apr. 29, 
2010, Open Secrets Blog, http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2010-04/disclose-disclaim-report.html. 
140 The groups would also be required to form a separate campaign expenditure account. POLITICO, Dem Bill would 
blunt campaign finance ruling, Apr. 29, 2010, http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfin?uuid=48CAEA3B-18FE-70B. 
141 Mack:inder, supra note 139. . 
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must appear. 142 Additionally, the top five donors of non-restricted funds to a group that 
purchases television-related ads will be listed on the screen at the end of the ad. In tum, 
corporate officials must report any political expenditure to their corporate boards and 
shareholders.143 
Two other aspects of the bill touch on some of the chief concerns of those outraged by 
Citizens United: the possibility of foreign money influencing U.S. elections and the ability of 
companies who are recipients of government contracts to make donations and simulate the 
appearance of corruption. The DISCLOSE Act would ban companies with more than twenty 
percent foreign ownership or whose boards are made up of a majority of foreign nationals from 
participating in US elections in any way. 144 Additionally, if one or more foreign nationals have 
the power to direct, dictate, or control the decision-making of a corporation or its U.S. 
subsidiary, that corporation may not contribute financially to any purpose relating to U.S. 
elections. The bill would also ban the practice of 'Pay to Play' by forbidding government 
contractors and recipients ofTARP funding from participating in elections in any way. 145 
iii. Constitutional Amendments 
An alternative approach to mere legislation is a constitutional amendment that overrules 
and neutralizes Citizens United. 146 The only long-term solution may be to give Congress plenary 
authority to enact comprehensive campaign finance reform, thus removing the ever-present 
possibility of future judicial interference. 147 Amending the Constitution, however, may be 
142 All corporations must disclose campaign related spending on their website with a clear link on its homepage 
within 24 hours of reporting the expenditure to the FEC. The contributions must also be disclosed to shareholders 
and·members of the organization in any financial reports provided on an annual basis. !d. 
143 Id. 
144 POLITICO, supra note 140. 
145 0nce a corporation has repaid the TARP funds, the ban is lifted; additionally, companies that have a contract 
with the government valued at less than $50,000 are not subject to the ban. !d. 
146 See Kom, supra note 19. 
147 ' See Udall, supra note 6, at 237. 
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unrealistic, controversial, and too time consuming to be a practical solution. 148 Without an 
amendment or reversal of Supreme Court precedent, many believe that special interest funds will 
continue to influence and corrupt the electoral and legislative process and that therefore, 
Congress must be given the authority and flexibility to break the cycle of unlimited special 
interest money. 149 
III. Recommendations and Analysis 
"There's one word to describe what's going on in the campaign-finance area: the word is 
obscene. And it's going to result in scandal and corruption and, eventually, opportunities for 
reform." 150 Perhaps that is the best hope for what currently seems like a lost cause; it may take 
the 2012 elections for Congress to be motivated, whether through the results of the election or 
the amount of contempt the American electorate exhibits against elected officials. Citizens 
United provides for the potential that independent corporate speech will overwhelm the 
American political system. 151 If anything, this atrocity will only provide greater impetus for the 
reforms needed to return American elections back to the people. Short of a complete reversal on 
recent First Amendment jurisprudence by the Supreme Court, legislative action by Congress is 
the only way to attack the issue of money in politics. 
There are three major ways that Congress could respond to this growing crisis of 
integrity: (1) requiring full disclosure of all political contributions; (2) revamping and enhancing 
148 R. Sam Garrett, Campaign Finance Policy After Citizens United v. Federal Elections Commission: Issues and 
Options for Congress, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 7-5700, 4, Feb. 1, 2010, available at 
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/137016.pdf. 
149 Udall, supra note 6, at 242-43 (positing that whenever new regulations are imposed, money will find a way 
through another loophole and that because the potential for corruption remains large whether via direct donations, 
soft money, issue ads, or independent expenditures, Congress must be given the ability to flexibly update regulations 
without worrying about their constitutional standing). 
15
e>rcim Barker, A guide to the new world of campaign finance: what you need to know about Super-PACs and 'dark 
money', TUSCON SENTINEL, July 11, 2011, available at 
http://www. tucsonsentinel.com/nationworld/report/071111_ super _pacs/a-guide-new-world-campaign-fmance/. 
151 Levitt, supra note 13, at 75 n. 26 (suggesting that the wealthiest citizens use their resources to entrench their own 
interests and "use their inequitable distributions to maintain the status quo against the majority desires," thereby 
undermining the democratic process). 
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the public financing of federal elections; or (3) requiring complete anonymity of all political 
donors. While far from perfect- and far from being able to act as a total stopgap to plug the 
cascade of corporate donations - a combination of requiring full disclosure and giving more 
opportunities for candidates to participate in a viable public financing system would be the best 
way to currently move forward. At the very least, such a move would restore some semblance of 
integrity in the system and those who are elected to run it and would be a starting point for more 
substantial reforms later on down the road. In the short term, requiring full disclosure will at least 
aid in combatting the appearance of corruption and allow the public to see who is behind the 
financing of American elections. However, in the long run, only a fully-supported, practical 
public financing system will be able to fully cure the political system from the ills from which it 
currently suffers. 
a. Full disclosure 
The dominant and preferred model of reform is to require complete and full disclosure of 
all information relating to political contributions of any sort and their sources. 152 Touted as a 
free market approach, it is premised on the assumption that people will actually care and pay 
attention to such information when making informed decisions during elections. The model fits 
well into a society where businesses are used to giving more information to the public, who in 
turn can better protect their own interests rather than rely on government command and control 
of that information. This gives people the power to make their own judgment calls, and it 
supplants the notion that transparency is a prerequisite for government accountability. 153 
152 1\.T 1 "78 1"0 
.1. .. oveci<:, supra note , , at v . 
t53 B ·.a. l nu.au t, supra note 24, at 273 . 
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Disclosure ultimately aids voters in predicting candidate's behavior once in office, provides data 
about the candidate's issue positions- including ones that may not be public. 154 
Disclosure is likely the most successful element of the U.S. campaign finance system and 
Congress needs to keep building on those past successes. 155 Full disclosure requires a delicate 
balancing act of anti-corruption, public education and political privacy/participation concems. 156 
It is a two-step process where electoral actors make reports to a government agency, generally 
the FEC, and that information is subsequently disseminated to the public at large. 157 
Since Buckley, disclosure has been recognized as "the least restrictive means of curbing 
the evils of campaign ignorance and corruption that Congress found to exist.'?158 With the 
continued blessing of the Supreme Court, disclosure has historically had three main 
justifications.159 Most importantly, disclosing who is funding political actors and messages 
serves to informing the voters. In doing so, it effectively deters corruption and the appearance of 
corruption by exposing large contributions and expenditures to the public eye. 160 Additionally, it 
allows the FEC and other agencies to enforce current campaign finance laws, as record-keeping, 
reporting, and disclosure requirements are essential means of gather data needed to detect 
violations of FECA' s contribution limits. 161 
154 Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Hiding Behind the Tax Code, the Dark Election of2010 and Why Tax-Exempt Entities 
Should Be Subject to Robust Federal Campaign Finance Disclosure Laws, 26 CHAPMAN J. L. & POL'Y 59, 93 (2011) 
(quoting Recent Legislation, Campaign Finance Reform-Issue Advocacy Organizations-Congress Mandates 
Contribution and Expenditure Requirements for Section 527 Organizations, 114 HARV. L. REv. 2209,2213-15 
(2001)). 
155 Briffault, supra note 24, at 273. 
156 Id. at 299 
157 Id. at 276. 
158 Torres-Spelliscy, supra note 154, at 66. 
159 Briffault, supra note 24, at 280; Buckley, 424 U.S. 1, 66 (1976). Eight justices expressly reaffirmed the 
constitutionality of requiring disclosure; absent evidence of "a reasonable probability of threats, harassment, or 
f~J'f~als." Levitt, supra note 13, at 221; Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 914-16 (citing McConnell, 540 U.S. at 198). 
161 Ji: 
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The vast majority of Americans already see the merits of a full disclosure model. 162 But 
disclosure among groups making electioneering communications dropped from nearly ninety-
seven percent in 2006 to thirty-four percent in 201 0 and disclosure of donors to groups making 
independent expenditures went from nearly ninety-seven percent in 2006 to seventy percent in 
2010. 163 Ten percent of groups favoring Republican revealed their donors and fifty percent of 
groups favoring Democrats revealed their donors. 164 The "sensible thing" for Congress to do is to 
devise rules that require disclosure of campaign activity no matter what tax status is adopted by 
the spender; there is a compelling government interest in providing transparency to the political 
process and the sources of money regardless of what the tax consequences are of the manner in 
which a group is organized. 165 
While disclosure should be the norm across the spectrum, there is a particular need for 
legislation to close the loopholes permitting the non-disclosure of bundlers. Bundling can be a 
far greater source of political influence than individual donations. 166 Disclosure will help the 
public better understand the forces behind a candidate and who has access to him as well of the 
practice of bundling L'l general- still a mystery to most Americans; as of now, the practice is still 
only lightly regulated. 167 
162 
"An extraordinary ninety-two percent of Americans want full disclosure of campaign contributors." Rich, supra 
note 21; even Republican House Speaker John Boehner believes in full disclosure: "We ought to have full disclosure 
of all money that we raise and how it is spent." Paul Loeb, Stop the Anonymous Hit Men: l~ake Shadowy Campaign 
Money the Issue, THE HUFFINGTONPOST, Oct.l1 , 2010, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/paul-loeb/stop-the-
anonymous-hit-me b 758627.html. 
163 --Youn, supra note 38, at 6. 
164 Prior to Citizens United, the rate of disclosure of such groups was one hundred percent. Korn, supra_note 19. 
165 Torres-Spelliscy, supra note 154, at 66. 
166 B .ffi 1 n au t, supra note 24, at 302. 
167 Id., "The bundling of political donations once was an innocuous play in the game book of Washington political 
operatives. Now, the fund-raising practice has grown so widespread, and some of its practitioners so brazen, that 
bundling has become the chief source of abuse in the American campaign-fmance system." Brody Mullins, Donor 
Bundling Emerges As Major Ill in '08 Race, WALL ST. J., Oct. 18, 2007, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119267248520862997.html 
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The public value of financial and personal information related to the practice of bundling 
would be immense, as the sums aggregated by bundlers are far greater than any amount an 
individual is able to give. 168 Currently, neither state nor federal law caps the amount anyone can 
bundle in an election. 169 Only funds bundled by registered lobbyists are ever required to be 
disclosed. 170 However, many are able to skirt the registration requirements and essentially 
function as lobbyists- and thus gamer the attention of powerful politicians- while remaining 
mostly anonymous. 171 Thus, under the current system, most bundlers are not considered 
lobbyists and therefore are not affected. 172 
A number of drawbacks suggest that merely passing legislation mandating disclosure will 
not solve all of the issues exacerbated by Citizens United; the disinfectant qualities of sunlight 
may unfortunately not be enough to combat the diseases afflicting the financing of campaigns 
and politicai advertisements. Imposing such a heavy burden may deter potential donors and this 
could be skewed against certain constituencies; this could in tum run afoul of the First 
Amendment by imposing an unneeded burden on particular groups. 173 Enhanced disclosure 
would likely chill some large donors who view contributions as a 'cost of doing business' or a 
line item in their annual budget. 174 It does not appear, however, that more disclosure would 
168 Briffault, supra note 24, at 303. 
169 Id. at 302. 
170 Id. (" ... the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act (HLOGA) requir[ es] federal campaign political 
committees and political party committees to disclose the bundled contributions of $15,000 or more that they receive 
from federally registered lobbyists in a six-month period."). Prior to HLOGA, committees were only required to 
disclose the names of bundlers who physically delivered checks to the campaign. Id. 
171 See Eric Lichtblau, Obama Backers Tied to Lobbies Raise Millions, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27,2011, 
http:/ /www.nytimes.com/20 1111 0/28/us/politics/obama-bundlers-have-ties-to-lobbying.html. 
172 Briffault, supra note 24, at 303(citing http://www.whitehouseforsale.org, which found reported that only 17 of 
Obama's 605 top bundlers and 77 ofMcCain's 851 top bundlers in the 2008 elections were registered lobbyists). 
173However, Buckley concluded that the potential chilling effects of forced disclosure, at least in the case of large 
parties/candidates, was worth the risk. Id. at 290. 
174 ld. at 291. Additionally, foreign direct investment in the US was down flfty-two percent in 2009 already, and 
some argue that discouraging corporate expenditures may "create a climate that the world will see as a disadvantage 
of investing in our country." Nancy McLemon, Unfortunate "Us" vs. "Them" Rhetoric Drives DISCLOSE Act, July 
1, 2010, THE HUFFINGTON POST, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/nancy-mclemon/unfortunate-us-vs-them-
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inhibit wealthy individuals from making or parties and candidates from accepting very large 
donations; 175 it may simply donations to 501(c)(4) groups who claim to exist for advocacy 
purposes yet blur the line between political and non-political entities. 176 
Moreover, disclosure alone does little to actually regulate how money affects politics and 
where it goes. Disclosure does not necessarily serve egalitarian interests, however, because it 
does not limit who may contribute, how much they can give, or how the money can be used. Any 
possible effects on voters' attitudes are highly speculative at best. 177 The vote may be "too blunt 
an instrument to be an effective means for the voter to make her views about the candidate's 
campaign finance practices known." 178 The notion that the voter can hold a candidate 
accountable in an election fails to acknowledge that each voter only has one vote and must make 
up her mind based on a number of complex issues. 179 Additionally, even if a voter was concerned 
solely with which corporations advocated for which candidates, it would be difficult to decipher 
the information, as many interest groups give to more than one candidate in the same race and 
even to both parties. 180 
Relying on disclosure alone would capitulate other goals of campaign finance reform 
such as voter equality, creating electoral competition, decreasing the amount of time spent 
fundraising, and reducing the amount of private money in politics. 181 Even in a digital age where 
rh_b_632143.html (stating that the U.S. must promote a competitive non-discriminatory environment instead of the 
'Us vs. Them' mentality that has been directed at mostly innocent foreign corporations). 
175 In fact, some groups would likely glory in forced disclosure because it would show their political power. 
Briffault, supra note 24, at 287. 
176 Id. Another concern is that disclosure would make it easier for politicians to trace their supporters and thereby 
reward them with their votes in exchange for continued support. Noveck, supra note 78, at 75. 
177 Noveck, supra note 78, at 103 n.176 (relying on an empirical study concluding that disclosure alone fails to 
produce more competition in elections or reduce the impact of large contributions) (David Schultz, Disclosure is Not 
Enough: Empirical Lessons from State Experiences, 3 ELECTION L. J. 349, 350 (2005)). 
178 Briffault, supra note 24, at 289. 
!
79 It is also doubtful that campaign contributions are at the top of many lists of things voters consider in making 
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information is available at the click of a button, the amount of information released by 
mandatory disclosure could cause an informational overload. This could potentially obfuscate the 
important data in a sea of numbers, thus not allowing the average voter to make the necessary 
connections and see the true money trail. 182 Additionally, mandating disclosure would likely 
require stringent enforcement by a new, large, and expensive regulatory agency- something that 
many are not willing to currently see created. 183 
As such, the real benefit of requiring disclosure may ultimately be that the public is 
educated about the electoral process and can therefore be more attuned to the patterns of interest 
group giving and their impact on the government when an important issue is being debated. 184 
Targeting large donors for disclosure -rather than the majority who give small amounts - would 
sharpen the public's focus on those who are most likely to effect the actions of elected officials 
rather than have a chilling effect on participation of small-time donors; thus, a monetary 
threshold on any disclosure requirement is necessary. 185 
b. Public Financing System 
For the last decade, the public financing system for Presidential elections has been in 
decline; one need only look at the rise of bundlers and independent expenditure groups to realize 
that it no longer feasible for most candidates to participate in such a system and risk being 
severely out-spent. 186 Unless the current system is amended- and a system to fund 
Congressional campaigns is created - only long-shot candidates, if any, will take advantage of 
1s2N k ovec , supra note 78, at 103. 
183 !d. 
184 Briffault, supra note 24, at 299. 
185 !d. 
186 Weintraub & Levine, supra note 5, at 465-66. 
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the system. 187 Indeed, no major party candidates in the previous two presidential elections relied 
on public funding, instead opting to raise funds privately. 188 The strings that come attached to 
public funding- including restrictions on how money can be spent and a time-consuming 
documentation and FEC auditing process - also deter those candidates who would otherwise 
qualify for public funding from using it. 189 Campaigns have been confident of both their ability 
and their opponent's ability to outraise the current spending limits for some time. 
A revamped system would level the field and provide equal opportunities for candidates 
to spread their messages in a way that would effectively minimize corruption. 190 Despite the 
potential costs associated with establishing an effective system of public financing, the 
opportunity to potentially rid the system of some special interest funds and allow lawmakers 
more time to focus on their jobs as legislators outweighs any associated costs. 191 Passing FENA 
is a necessary prerequisite to the development of a system of financing for Congress, and more 
would need to be done to revamp the Presidential system. FENA would 'broaden and deepen the 
donor poor and allow new voters to have a stake in the electoral process."192Small contributions 
are a healthy part of a participatory democracy. 193 
FENA, however, would be completely voluntary and would not impose spending limits 
on participants as long as they agreed to limit private individual contributions to no more than 
187 Serious candidates will not return to the system unless it can provide sufficient funding that will allow them to 
compete with the amount of money being raised and spent by non-participating candidates and outside groups. I d. 
at 475. 
188 I d. at 465. 
189 Id. 
190 Id. at 475. 
191 
"We already pay for congressional campaigns, we just label it the national debt. Interests that donate to 
campaigns often get what they want from legislation, and we all pay for that, by comparison, public financing seems 
like a bargain." The Fair Elections Now Act, AMERICANS FOR CAMPAIGN REFORM, 
http://www.acrreform.org/legislationlfair-elections-now-act/. 
192 Youn, supra note 38, at i5. 
193 Id. 
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$100. 194 This framework alone is not workable because those who opt-out would be grossly 
outspent by their wealthy opponents who do not participate. 195 The bill also does not address 
problem of unlimited spending by corporations or interest groups left open by Citizens United, 
leaving publicly financed candidates at a disadvantage if they are subject to attacks by 
independent groups. 196 Thus, while FENA would take care of part of the problem, it would only 
be effective if passed in conjunction with a bill similar to the DISCLOSE Act so that those who 
do not choose to participate in such a system will still be forced to disclose who is funding their 
campaigns. 
c. Information Suppression Model 
Another alternative that has been debated among scholars is to not allow candidates to 
know the identity of donors. This would eliminate ability of donations to have a quid pro quo 
corrupt effect. Under this model, anonymous donations to candidates, parties, and committees 
would be made through a blind trust operated by the FEC. 197 At most, the FEC could only reveal 
that a donor donated '$200 +' to a particular person/group. 198 Politicians would hypothetically 
not know who to reward with their votes once in office, but this would depend wholly on the 
integrity of the staff of the trust, as corruption could lead to data leaks. 199 Although the model 
calls for complete disclosure of contributions after 10 years, it is hard to imagine that a public 
used to transparency and having information at their fingertips would be willing to place trust in 
government to get it right and run such a system with integrity. 200 
194 1 Uda 1, supra note 6, at 248. 
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IV. Conclusion 
The future of our political system depends on the ability of Congress to pass and 
implement the regulations necessary to shed light on the enormous amounts of money being 
channeled into political advertisements and campaigns. In the absence of a constitutional 
amendment, it is uPlikely that Congress could pass legislation overturning Citizens U.11ited that 
could withstand judicial scrutiny; however, some action must be taken to restore the public trust. 
Shedding light on anonymous donors and the true sources behind political advertisements will 
only serve to further educate and enlighten the public and thereby supplant the First Amendment 
values held so dear by the American people and Supreme Court justices alike. Congress would 
be wise to allow some sunlight in to serve as a disinfectant to the corrosive special interests 
funds that tighten their grip on lawmakers each day. Not only would they free themselves from 
the constant cycle of fundraising now endured by most elected officials, politicians and 
candidates would be able to spend more time understanding the issues of the day and connecting 
with those constituents who are not wealthy enough to 'buy' their time. 
In the end, the passage ofFENA and a bill similar to the DISCLOSE Act will be a good 
first step towards restoring integrity in the system. However, Congress should not stop there, and 
if practical, should pursue a Constitutional Amendment that would grant it the power and 
flexibility to combat the uninhibited flow of corporate funds into American elections. 
Accountability is key- both for politicians and for those who choose to donate money for 
political causes, whether individuals or corporations. The 2008 and 2010 elections showed- and 
the 2012 elections are on pace to show - that there is too much anonymous money floating 
around the political system purporting to speak on behalf of the public, a certain party, or a 
candidate. 
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Ninety-two percent of the American people cannot be wrong, and eventually, their voices 
will be heard?01 The time to act is now, and it may be too late to restore the trust of the people in 
their government if Congress waits until after the 2012 elections to mandate full disclosure and 
revitalize the public financing of federal elections. At stake is nothing less than our democracy 
itself. 
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